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Farmers need information about the expected value and variability of
net revenues for alternative crop insurance and futures hedging
strategies to manage risk.  Specifically, the model will determine which
risk management strategies are most desirable under various levels of
risk aversion.  The unstable futures basis relation in the data used in the
simulation model contributed to increased variability of net revenues.  In
general, none of the crop insurance or hedging strategies markedly
reduced variability of net revenue and relative riskiness when compared
with the cash strategy.  Revenue Assurance strategies were the most
effective at setting a floor on net revenues.  As a result, Revenue
Assurance products may perform well for extremely risk averse
producers.  
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Introduction
The revenues that farmers receive from the production of field crops are risky due to uncertain
weather impacts on yields and uncertain market impacts on prices.  Historically, producers have relied
on the federal government to manage income risk through a price support program.  Under the
government program, farmers would receive a deficiency payment during periods when the market
price fell below a specified target price.  This payment would help farmers manage the downside
income risk associated with adverse price movements.  Producers were required under the program to
restrict acreage grown in order to receive the deficiency payment. With the passage of the Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR)Act of 1996, deficiency payments for many crops were
replaced by contract payments, and acreage reduction programs were eliminated.  Contract payments
were set for fixed amounts through the year 2002 and are not expected to change regardless of future
prices and yields (Young and Shields, 1996).  Now that these restrictions have been eliminated,
farmers can grow what they think will be the most profitable crop given their expectations of price and
yield at planting time.
The FAIR Act and previous farm bill legislation have encouraged the development of alternative
income protection strategies for farmers.  These risk management products were designed to help
farmers manage yield and price volatility in the absence of price support programs and acreage controls
being phased out under the FAIR Act.  Farmers have a number of traditional and new risk management
alternatives they can use to mitigate the effects of price and yield risk in the new environment.  Doing
nothing to obtain downside protection is one strategy farmers can follow.  In this case, the producer3
would sell or store grain to sell at market prices.  However, doing nothing may not be an optimal
strategy depending on a farmers risk attitude.  Several strategies have been or are currently being
introduced that farmers can use to mitigate price and yield risk.  Futures market hedging provides a
producer with the opportunity to "lock in" a price before harvest through the use of commodity futures
and options contracts.  The ability to lock in a price before harvest on a pre-determined level of
production allows a farmer to develop a floor below which gross revenues cannot fall.  A futures
contract legally obligates a holder to either deliver or accept delivery of the contracted commodity on
or by some specified date in the future (National Futures Association).  Here the farmer must make a
financial commitment in the form of margin for futures contracts or premiums for options.  Futures
contracts on corn are for 5,000 bushels of no. 2 yellow corn. Traditionally, these contracts are used to
hedge price risk.  A corn producer making hedging decisions before planting will be interested in the
basis, or the difference between the local cash price and the futures contract price.  This difference is
mainly due to transportation costs and time associated with shipping the corn from one destination to
another.  It is important to note that Futures contracts provide no yield protection.  In fact, if the
producer’s crop is completely wiped out, then the producer will be forced to buy corn on the open
market to fulfill his contract.  
There are also a variety of  products available from private insurance companies but reinsured
through the federal government such as:  Catastrophic coverage (CAT), Multiple Peril Crop Insurance
(MPCI), MPCI with replacement coverage, Group Risk Plan (GRP), Revenue Assurance (RA),
Income Protection (IP), Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC), and Crop Revenue Coverage Plus
(CRCPlus).  In general, the purpose of these products is to provide a floor beyond which gross4
revenues cannot fall.  This is accomplished by insuring levels of yield or gross revenue as a percentage
of the operation's recent average level of yield or gross revenue.  If no yield or revenue data series is
available the local County average is used.  Some of these products are currently available to a farmer
depending on the state, crop, and product.  
CAT coverage pays on 50 percent of actual yield at 60 percent of expected market price. 
MPCI coverage allows a producer to select a yield coverage level from 50 to 75 percent of the
average from the last five years of historic yields.  Whenever the harvested yield falls below the
pre-selected coverage limit, an indemnity is paid at a per bushel rate set by the government. MPCI
policies have been widely used in the recent past.  The GRP coverage differs in that the farmer's crop
production history does not enter the picture.  When enrolling in this policy one will select a yield level
and price for the county in which one resides.  If the county average yield drops below the selected
yield, an indemnity is paid.  IP combines yield and price protection by setting an income guarantee per
acre based on historic yields and projected prices at harvest.  The CRC products differ from an IP
policy in that the producer will receive an indemnity calculated from either a base price or a harvest
price, whichever is higher.  This base price and the harvest price are the monthly moving averages for
the daily settlement prices during the February and November trading periods of the December Corn
futures contract respectively.  The CRC products are similar in this respect to an Asian option.  The
CRCPlus policy allows the insured to increase the base price.  This gives extra protection against a
downside market swing.  Along with GRP products, CRC is relatively new and also maintains a
significant market share.  Under a RA policy, 65 percent to 75 percent of historical five year moving
average revenue is guaranteed to the producer.  This product was originally proposed to be provided at5
low cost by the federal government, but is currently offered through private insurance companies in
some locations. 
This study will compare some of the alternatives available or expected to be available to West
Tennessee Corn Producers, namely Multiple Peril Crop Insurance, Crop Revenue Coverage, futures
hedges, and Revenue Assurance.  
Review of Literature
Several researchers have evaluated the effectiveness of alternative income protection strategies
in mitigating risk in a post FAIR Act environment.  Harwood, et al. (1996) compared Crop Revenue
Coverage (CRC), Income Protection (IP), Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI), and forward
contracting risk management strategies for corn producers in Illinois, Iowa, North Carolina, and South
Dakota.  They ranked the risk management alternatives based on the probability of revenue falling
below 70 percent of an expected preplanting level.  The results, from best to worst were IP, CRC, a
combination of crop insurance and forward contracting, crop insurance alone, and forward contracting
alone.   However, premiums were not included in the revenue assessment and no weight was given to
strategies that would have resulted in higher probabilities of revenue above projected levels.  Harwood,
et al. also analyzed data from the 1993 Farm Costs and Returns Survey and found that producers with
higher farm sales were less likely to obtain insurance and more likely to hedge production.  
Dhuyvetter and Kastens (1997) compared net revenues from  no crop insurance versus using
CAT, MPCI, and CRC coverage options for a dryland Kansas wheat farm.  They also examined6
pre-harvest hedging strategies in conjunction with using crop insurance.  CRC produced the highest
minimum net revenue value (maxi-min criterion) among the alternatives analyzed.  The maxi-min strategy
is preferred by decision makers who are extremely risk averse (Grub, 1986). The MPCI plan
maximized the expected net revenue among the alternatives.  The strategy that maximizes expected net
revenue is preferred by risk neutral decision makers.  Furthermore,  Dhuyvetter and Kastens observed
that although the variability of revenues is generally lower with CRC than with MPCI, the advantage of
CRC over MPCI decreases as the amount of production hedged  increases. 
Heifner and Coble (1997) used numerical integration to find the optimal price futures and
options hedge ratios in conjunction with crop insurance and forward contracting for corn producers in
Dewitt County, Illinois.  The crop insurance strategies that they evaluated were: 1) MPCI, 2) MPCI
with replacement coverage, 3) IP, and 4) CRC.  Their model accounted for differences in yield-price
correlation and yield variability in order to apply their results over areas without a 'natural hedge' and/or
high yield variability.  Furthermore, the gains in hedging effectiveness were normalized under four
different levels of risk aversion.  Without forward pricing of production, IP and CRC were found to be
superior to MPCI in reducing risk over four combinations of yield-price correlation and yield variability. 
With forward pricing of production, IP and CRC also outperformed MPCI and provided protection to
a producer who has overcommited production through forward contracting.  Gray et al. (1995) have
shown that incomes could be stabilized and that payments to producers would be substantially less with
Revenue Assurance (RA) than under the former price support programs. 7
Methods and Data
Simulation and enterprise budgeting methods were used to achieve the objectives of this study. 
Trapp defines simulation as "the process of numerically solving a computerized mathematical model in
an attempt to reproduce the actual essential elements of an operating system (p.130)."  Simulation
facilitates experimentation with alternative income protection strategies and the evaluation of tradeoffs in
the expected value and variability of net revenues among strategies.  
Simulation Model
The farm decision maker was assumed to make planting hedging and crop insurance decisions
in February.  The corn crop was assumed to be harvested and sold in November.  Yield and price data
reported in Table 1 were used to estimate expected (mean) values and variance-covariance coefficients
for the simulation model.  Obion County corn yields (1988-1996) were from Tennessee Agriculture
(Tennessee Department of Agriculture).  Northwest Tennessee November average cash market prices
used to represent Obion County prices were from Tennessee Market Highlights (Tennessee
Department of Agriculture).  The 1995 cash price of $3.26/bushel was deemed to be an outlier that
would bias upward the probability of a high corn price received by farmers and may overstate
variability of net revenue experienced by farmers.  Consequently, the 1988-94 portion of the time-
series in Table 1 was used to estimate coefficients for this simulation model.  Removing the 1995-96
years reduced the variability in gross revenue by approximately 50 percent.  February and November8
averages for the December Corn contract were computed using data from the Chicago Board of
Trade.  Evaluations of the data for an inflationary trend in prices and upward trends in yields due to
changes in technology were found to not be statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. For the
futures hedge, the producer was assumed to sell a December corn futures contract in February and buy
back the December futures contract in November.  Indemnity payments from crop insurance strategies
were determined in November after the crop was harvested and sold.  Net revenue (NR) for a farmer
producing corn, hedging with futures and options, and purchasing crop insurance can be written as:  
(1)                                     NR = P × Y + HR - HC + ID - IC - OC,
where P is the cash price for corn ($/bushel), Y is the yield of corn (lb./acre); HR is the revenue from
pre-harvest hedging activities with futures or options ($/acre); ID is the indemnity payment received
from crop insurance activities ($/acre); HC is the cost of hedging activities; IC is the premiums paid for
crop insurance coverage ($/acre); and OC is the estimated variable expenses, fixed equipment and
labor costs, and overhead expenses that do not change with the hedging or insurance strategies
($/acre).  This residual (NR) is the estimated return to a farmer for land, management and risk (Boehlje
and Eidman, 1984).  HR for the futures strategy was determined by the difference between futures
contract prices in February and November and the basis, or the difference between the November
futures and cash prices.  This difference was multiplied by the bushels of production hedged.  For the
options strategy, HR was determined by multiplying the bushels of production hedged by the premium
value of the option in November.  HC for the futures hedge included commission expenses and taxes9
and interest costs on initial margin.  ID is the payout made by the insurance company for a specified
corn yield and/or corn price selection or for a specified level of gross revenue coverage.  
To calculate Stochastic NR's for the production, hedging, and crop insurance activities
represented in equation (1), the five random values simulated were: 1) harvested corn yield, 2) the
November cash corn price for Obion County, 3) the February futures price for the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT) December corn contract, and 4) the December futures price for the Chicago Board of
Trade (CBOT) December corn contract.  To simulate random values for the production, hedging, and
insurance activities in equation (1), five random, correlated variates were generated as follows:
(2)              D = E + A* R,
where D is a 4 x 1 vector of random values, E is a 4 x 1 vector of expected values, A* is a 4 x 4 matrix
of coefficients, and R is a 4 x 1 vector of lognormally distributed random deviates.  A lognormal
distribution was assumed to preclude negative yields or commodity prices.  A* in equation (2) is an
upper triangular matrix of coefficients derived from the estimated variance-covariance matrix of the five
yield and price random variables (Clements, Mapp, and Eidman; Fishman).  
The estimated variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model is presented in Table 2. 
The negative correlation of -0.8138 between yields and prices at harvest is indicative of the basic
supply and demand relationship.  Higher yields and production tend to produce lower prices.  The
correlation of .96065 between the TN cash and Futures in November is extremely high due to
competitive markets.  The correlation coefficients of -0.7548 and -0.8138 display typical yield/price10
relationships with the November Futures and local prices respectively.  The correlations of -0.7132,
and -0.7849 between February futures and November prices in Tennessee and Chicago respectively
are indicative of the relationship between storage costs and normal seasonal market trends.  In other
words,  the November prices will be lower than in February 
during a normal marketing year due to a surplus at harvest.  
  
Strategies Simulated
The 26 hedging and insurance strategies simulated with the model are outlined in Table 3.  The
per acre costs for each income protection strategy simulated are also in Table 3.  The cash market
strategy assumes that the farmer does not hedge against price risk, does not purchase insurance, and
sells production on the cash market.  The coverage levels for Revenue Assurance (RA), CRC, and
MPCI insurance products modeled were 65,70, and 75 percent.
MPCI strategies modeled were 65, 70, and 75 percent of the 5-year average of Obion county
corn yields.  MPCI polices can be purchased at varying indemnity rates for the 70 and 75% yield
selections.  MPCI policies were modeled  at the five levels of subsidized yield coverage and indemnity
payment rates:  65 percent of yield at $2.60 per bushel, 70 percent at $2.60 per bushel, 70 percent at
$2.42 per bushel, 75 percent at $2.60 per bushel, 75 percent at $2.26 per bushel, respectively.  
Hedging with futures contracts was considered both alone and in combination with MPCI to
cover both price and yield risk.  Future hedges were placed on 100 percent (100% futures hedge) and
50 percent (50% futures hedge) of the historical average yield.  Interest on margin deposits was11
calculated at an 11 percent annual rate for eight months of the year.  This interest was applied to 5
percent of the initial February futures price times the number of contracts purchased (National Futures
Association).  Interest charges on margin calls due to fluctuations in the futures price before harvest
were ignored in the analysis. 
The other costs of production in equation (1) that were subtracted from revenues when
estimating net revenues were from Gerloff and Maxey (1997).  These costs include machinery, labor,
and materials expenses to produce an acre of corn using 8-row equipment.  The total variable
expenses, fixed equipment and labor costs, and overhead expenses used in the simulation totaled
$170.40 per acre.
Simulation Analysis
The steps to analyze the output from the simulation model are as follows.  First, a procedure
suggested by Cambell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) was used to evaluate the accuracy of the model in
simulating Obion County corn net revenues.  Next, the simulated output for each income protection
strategy was analyzed in terms of evaluating the tradeoffs among expected net revenues, variance of net
revenues, and minimum net revenues.  Finally, the probability of achieving various rates of return on
investment was evaluated for alternative income protection strategies.  Each of these steps is described
in this section.  
Cambell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997) state that a confidence interval for a simulation run of n
observations can be constructed in the following manner:  12











where  is the sample mean of net revenue from the – observation simulation run,  1.96 is the Z-H(0) 8
value for the two-tailed t-test at the 95 percent probability level, FNR  is the sample standard deviation
from the – observation simulation run, and  is the true mean net revenue taken from the originalH(0)
data points. The following relationship from equation (6) was used to evaluate simulation accuracy for
an – observation simulation run using the cash market strategy:  
The larger the value of n, the tighter the simulated confidence interval is around the true expected net
revenue and the higher the degree of accuracy.  For a given value of n, there exists a 95 percent
probability that the true mean net revenue will fall within the simulated confidence interval on each of 20
simulation runs that were conducted.  
Model Evaluation
Net revenue statistics for the 26 strategies simulated are presented in Table 4.  The number of
observations simulated for each strategy within a run was 192.  The cash market strategy was used to
evaluate the accuracy of the model.  The simulated mean and standard deviation of net revenues for the13
cash strategy were $97,626 and $37,717, respectively.  The actual mean and standard deviation of net
revenues from the 1988 through 1994 data series for Obion County were $96,676 and $31,521. 
Hence, the calculated degree of simulation accuracy using equation (7) and averaged across 20
simulation runs is $5,335.  Consequently, the average 95 percent confidence interval for the cash
market strategy is $92,291 # H(0) # $102,961.  The simulated cash strategy net revenue of $97,626
falls within this interval suggesting the model is accurate at the 95 percent confidence level.  
To evaluate the futures hedging strategy performance in the model, the simulated basis was
compared with the actual basis for the 1984 to 1994 period.  The difference between the November
futures and northwest Tennessee cash price averaged $0.057/bushel across twenty simulation runs. 
The simulated basis is similar to the $0.064/bushel for the original data points.  The standard deviation
of the simulated basis is $0.15/bushel, which is twice the standard deviation of $0.07/bushel in the
original data points.  The actual basis and the simulated basis were more variable than cash market
prices for the period.  The coefficient of variation for cash price was 10.07 compared with 102.46 for
the actual basis and 234.38 for the simulated basis.  The high variability in the basis for this period may
cause the hedging strategy to not perform well as a risk reduction strategy in the simulation.  
Stochastic Dominance Analysis
The stochastic dominance procedure is based on the theory of expected utility and involves a
pair-wise comparison of expected utilities derived by decision makers from a set of risky net revenues
(King and Robison, 1984).  For example, take a person who displays utility for income (x) defined by14
the monotonically increasing function u(x).  This person must decide between two risky sets of net
revenues, A1 and A2, with cumulative outcome probability distribution functions (CDFs) represented by
G(x), and F(x), respectively.  When the expected utility of  F(x) is greater than the expected utility of
G(x), then A2 stochastically dominates A1 and is preferred by that person.  Using this pair-wise
comparison procedure, stochastic dominance provides an ordering of choices by placing them into two
mutually exclusive sets:  the risk efficient set and the risk inefficient set.  Alternatives in the efficient set
will always provide higher expected utilities than ones in the inefficient set regardless of one’s attitude
towards risk. 
Farmer’s risk attitudes that can be modeled using alternative stochastic dominance criteria fall
into three general categories: risk averse, risk neutral, and risk seeking behaviors (King and Robison,
1984).  For risk averse farmers, their utility increases with net revenue but at a decreasing rate, i.e., u’
(x) > 0 and u’‘ (x) < 0.  By definition, a risk averter would be willing to accept a slightly lower mean
net revenue in exchange for a significantly less variable (risky) distribution of net revenues.  If  u’ (x) > 0
and u’‘ (x) = 0, utility increases at a constant rate as net revenue increases and the individual is said to
be risk neutral.  These persons will only consider expected (mean) net revenue when ranking
alternatives.  For risk seeking behavior, u’ (x) > 0 and u’‘ (x) > 0, utility increases at an increasing rate
as net revenue increases.  A risk seeker could be willing to accept lower mean net revenue in exchange
for a riskier distribution of net revenue-especially distributions that have one or more very large net
revenue values.  
The two stochastic dominance criteria used to examine the net revenues for alternative income
protection strategies are first-degree stochastic dominance (FSD) and second-degree stochastic15
dominance (SSD).  FSD imposes the single restriction, u’ (x) > 0, on decision maker preferences
regardless of one’s risk attitude.  At all levels of cumulative probability, a strategy in the FSD set
produces net revenue equal to or greater than net revenue from a strategy in the inefficient set.  In
graphical terms, the two cumulative outcome probability distribution functions (CDFs) represented by
G(x), and F(x) for the two risky sets of net revenues A1 and A2,  respectively could never cross. 
However, in empirical analysis many distributions will cross each other and cannot be ranked using the
FSD criterion.  It is therefore necessary to seek a more restrictive concept of efficiency so that one can
judge between risky prospects any time there is a chance that one alternative is not 100 percent sure to
be superior.  This problem is addressed by second degree stochastic dominance (SSD).
The SSD criterion was developed by Hadar and Russell (1969) and Hanoch and Levy (1969)
as a means of predicting a decision maker’s choice between given pairs of risky alternatives without
having any knowledge of a decision maker’s utility function other than it is monotonically increasing and
strictly concave (the decision maker is risk averse).  In graphical terms, the two cumulative outcome
probability distribution functions (CDFs) represented by G(x), and F(x) for the two risky sets of net
revenues A1 and A2,  respectively can cross and still be ranked using the SSD criterion.  Like FSD,
SSD will include the maximin and expected net revenue maximizing strategies.  In this study, a computer
program by Cochran and Raskin was used to evaluate strategies for 20 simulation runs based on FSD
and SSD criterion.
Net Revenue Evaluation16
The top five strategies in order of descending mean net revenues are:  (1) futures hedge on 100
percent of the historical yield average, (2) futures hedge on 50 percent of the historical yield average,
(3) combination of the 100 percent futures hedge and multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) with 65
percent yield coverage at $2.45/bushel, (4)cash market, and (5) combination of the 100 percent futures
hedge and MPCI with 70 percent coverage at $2.45/ bushel.  The futures hedge on 100 percent of the
historical yield average produced mean net revenue of $101,501, compared with $97,626 for the cash
market strategy.  However, the standard deviation of net revenue for the futures hedging strategy was
$67,289, nearly double the $37,717 standard deviation of the cash market strategy.  A textbook
futures hedge involves a tradeoff of lower expected net revenue for a smaller variance of net revenue
for a risk averse decision maker.  The reasons for the higher mean and standard deviation of net
revenues for the futures hedge in the model are as follows.  First, the amount of total production hedged
may be too high for a producer interested in reducing price risk.  Second, the basis relation in the model
is more variable than cash market prices causing more variability in net revenues from futures hedges. 
Because both yields and prices are stochastic in the model, the hedging strategy in some years is
speculative when simulated production is less than the 120,000 bushel amount hedged on the futures
market.  For example, yield that is two standard deviations below the mean of 116 bushels/acre is 72
bushels/acre and results in a 48,000 bushel production shortfall under this hedging scenario.  If the cost
of buying back the corn in November is greater than what it has sold for in February on the futures
market, the farmer takes a direct loss on the 48,000 bushel shortfall.  On the other hand, if production
is above average, and if the cost of buying corn on the futures market is less in November than in
February, the profit from hedging is higher than in the cash market.  Farmers who are risk neutral would17
prefer the futures hedge on 100 percent of the historical yield average over all other income protection
strategies under the price and yield scenario modeled.  Farmers who are risk averse are interested in
strategies involving tradeoffs of mean net revenue for lower variance of net revenues.  Producers who
are extremely risk averse prefer strategies that maximize the minimum revenue (maximin strategy).  The
top five strategies in minimizing variance of net revenues were alternative crop insurance strategies: (1)
CRC, 75 percent coverage; (2)MPCI, 75 percent yield coverage at $2.45/bushel; (3) MPCI, 75
percent yield coverage at $2.13/bushel; (4) CRC, 65 percent coverage; and (5) MPCI, 70 percent
coverage at $2.45/bushel.  For CRC with 75 percent coverage, mean net revenue of $72,512 was
reduced 26 percent less than the cash market strategy while the $35,511 standard deviation of net
revenue was only 6 percent lower than the cash strategy.  In terms of relative risk as measured by the
coefficient of variation, the cash strategy was less risky (CV=38.6) than the CRC strategy (CV=48.9). 
In general, none of the crop insurance or hedging strategies markedly reduced variability of net revenue
and relative riskiness when compared with the cash strategy.  
The top five strategies that maximized the average minimum net revenue (maximin criterion) of
the 20 simulations are: (1) Revenue Assurance, 75% coverage, (2) Revenue Assurance, 70%
coverage, (3) cash market prices, (4) Revenue Assurance 65% coverage, (5) Crop Revenue Coverage
75% coverage.  The actual yield and price data used to make the simulation model operational did not
contain extremely low values.  This may partially explain the appearance of the cash market strategy in
the above.  Revenue Assurance strategies were the most effective at setting a floor on net revenues with
minimum values ranging from $18,118 to $24,338 for 75 percent coverage.  These minimum net
revenues compare with $9,964 for the cash market strategy.  As a result, Revenue Assurance products18
may perform well for extremely risk averse producers.  However, RA strategies did not significantly
lower the standard deviation of net revenues, but did lower mean net revenues by three to 15 percent
depending on the coverage and premium level.  Consequently, the relative riskiness of RA strategies
was higher than the cash strategy with coefficient of variations ranging from 41.5 to 44.6 depending on
the coverage and premium level.  
The stochastic dominance results are listed in Table 5.  Three strategies were in the risk efficient
set for both the first- and second-degree stochastic dominance criteria on all 20 simulation runs:   (1)
cash market, (2) 100 percent futures hedge, and (3) 50 percent futures hedge.  These three strategies
would be preferred by decision makers who are risk averse.  However, in terms of the level of risk
aversion, it is likely that the futures hedging strategies would be preferred by individuals who are risk
neutral or slightly risk averse.  The cash market strategy would likely be preferred by individuals who
have a higher degree of risk averse behavior.  The next best strategies in terms of the number of times
that they appeared in the FSD efficient set were:  (1) a combination of the 100 percent futures hedge
and multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI) with 75 percent yield coverage at $2.13/bushel and (2)
Revenue Assurance, 75 percent coverage at 75 percent of premium.  Each of these strategies appeared
in the FSD efficient set in 13 out of the 20 simulation runs.  Under the second-degree stochastic
dominance criterion, the next best strategies in terms of the number of times that they appeared in the
SSD efficient set were:  (1) Revenue Assurance, 75 percent coverage at 75 percent of premium and
(2) Revenue Assurance, 75 percent coverage at 100 percent of the premium.  These two RA strategies
appeared in the SSD efficient 13 and seven times, respectively, out of 20 simulations.  Besides the top
three strategies of Cash Market and Futures hedges, only the Revenue Assurance strategies appeared19
in the SSD efficient set more than once out of 20 simulations.  Furthermore, the Revenue Assurance
strategies were in the second-degree stochastic dominance efficient set in every trial for which they also
appeared in the first-degree stochastic dominance efficient set.  This result was far different than the
case for strategies using a combination of futures hedges with MPCI at 75 percent coverage at $2.13/
bu and 70 percent yield coverage at $2.28/ bu.  These strategies appeared in the first-degree stochastic
dominance efficient set more than any other strategies but failed to appear in the second-degree
stochastic dominance efficient set.  Among the crop insurance strategies evaluated, RA appears to have
the greatest potential to be a risk preferred strategy for decision makers who have a higher degree of
risk averse behavior.  RA produced the highest minimum net revenues in the simulation but did not
markedly affect the variance of net revenues.  
Summary and Conclusions
This study evaluated the expected value and variability of net revenues for alternative income
protection strategies for a large corn enterprise located in Northwest Tennessee.  A simulation model
was developed to generate the randomly correlated draws from which net revenues were then
calculated for each strategy.  The following criteria were used to evaluate net revenues: the expected
value of net revenues, the variance of net revenues, the minimum value of net revenues, and the rates of
return and investment in land, buildings, and equipment for corn production.  
Producers interested in maximizing profit would not use crop insurance.  In general, none of the
crop insurance or hedging strategies were very effective in reducing the variability of net revenues and20
the relative riskiness when compared with not using any yield or price protection.  However, RA at the
75 percent coverage level was the most effective strategy in setting a floor on the minimum value of net
revenue.  In the simulation, the traditional hedge of a short futures position maximized expected net
revenue but also increased the variability of net revenues.  The unstable futures basis relation in the data
used in the simulation model and the large amount of production hedged may have contributed to
increased variability of net revenues.  Consequently, the futures hedging strategies were risk efficient for
risk neutral and slightly risk averse decision makers.  For a decision maker with a higher degree of risk
averse behavior, the cash market and Revenue Assurance strategies may be the dominant strategies. 
Revenue Assurance at the 70 and 75 percent coverage levels were superior in setting a floor on
minimum net revenues.  As a result, Revenue Assurance may be preferred by extremely risk averse
decision makers.  While the Revenue Assurance strategies were able to maximize-minimum net
revenue, their truncated tails did not appreciably  lower the variability of net revenues in the simulation. 
Moreover, the cash market, RA, CRC, and MPCI strategies were the most likely to cover all of the
variable and fixed costs of production in the simulation. 21
Table 1.  Obion County corn yields and market prices used to estimate expected values and
the variance-covariance coefficients for the simulation model

















1988 110 2.57 2.69 2.17
1989 128 2.40 2.38 2.71
1990 111 2.29 2.26 2.47
1991 90 2.39 2.43 2.59
1992 147 1.96 2.12 2.70
1993 91 2.66 2.74 2.40
1994 136 2.06 2.16 2.68
1995 147 3.26 3.28 2.57
1996 134 2.66 2.68 3.08
Average,
1988-94
116 2.33 2.40 2.53
Sources:  a Tennessee Deparment of Agriculture.  Tennessee Agriculture.  1988-96 Annual Issues. 
Tennessee Agricultural Statistics Service, Nashville, TN; bAgricultural Extension Service.  Tennessee
Market Highlights.  November 1988-96 monthly issues;  cChicago Board of Trade, Chicago, Illinois
1988-96.22













a 477.8 -3.86898         
(-0.8138)d
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(-0.7548)
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(0.5622)
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(-0.5278)
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b 0.06439 255.98     
(0.96065)
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(-0.7132)
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Sources:  a Tennessee Department of Agriculture.  Tennessee Agriculture.  1988-96 Annual Issues. 
Tennessee Agricultural Statistics Service, Nashville, TN; bAgricultural Extension Service.  Tennessee
Market Highlights.  November 1988-96 monthly issues;  cChicago Board of Trade, Chicago, Illinois
1988-96.
d The correlation coefficient is in parenthesis23
Table 3. Alternative income protection strategies simulated in the analysis
Strategy Cost /Acre (Dollars)
Cash Market  0.00
Revenue Assurance                                             
        65% coverage 
                                                             
     4.45 (× 75% = 3.34, × 125% = 5.56) 
    70% coverage 8.25 (× 75% =  6.19, × 125% = 10.31)
    75% coverage 12.44 (× 75% =  9.33, × 125% = 15.55)
Crop Revenue Coverage,                                     
        65% coverage
                                                             
     12.93a
    70% coverage 18.52a
    75% coverage 26.69a
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI),                 
      75% Yield coverage at $2.13/ bu  
                                                             
    17.27a,b
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu  20.83a,b
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 12.37a,b
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 13.78a,b
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 8.89a,b
50% Futures hedge and MPCI                             
        75% yield coverage at $2.13 / bu
                                                             
    17.27b + $0.62/acrec + margin
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 20.83b + $0.62/acrec + margin
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 12.37b + $0.62/acrec + margin
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 13.78b + $0.62/acrec + margin
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 8.89 b   + $0.62/acrec + margin
100% Futures hedge and MPCI                            
       75% yield coverage at $2.13 / bu
                                                             
    17.27b + $1.24/acrec + margin
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 20.83b + $1.24/acrec + margin
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 12.37b + $1.24/acrec + margin
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 13.78b +$1.24/acrec + margin
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 8.89 b   +$1.24/acrec  + margin
100% Futures hedge on the historical yield
average 
 $1.24/acrec + margin 
50% Futures hedge on the historical yield average  $0.62/acrec + margin
a  Personal communication with Jerry Jarmon, Insurance agent, Alexandria, IN, September, 1997.
b  Includes $10 service charge prorated over 1,000 acres
c Commissions and tax of $51.72 per contract times the number of contracts purchased divided by 1,000
acres.  The number of contracts purchased for 100 and 50 percent of the historical yield average were 24
and 12, respectively.24
Table 4. Simulated net revenue statistics averaged over 20 simulations (Dollars)
Strategy                            Means         Standard deviation  MaximumMinimum         Skewness
Cash Market    97626 37717 210155 9964 0.27
Revenue Assurance, 65% coverage       93186 37702 205705 7376 0.27
    65% coverage at 75% of premium 94296 37702 206815 8486 0.27
    65% coverage at 125% of premium 92076 37702 204595 6266 0.27
Revenue Assurance,70% coverage 89466        37437 201905         12500            0.30
    70% coverage at 75% of premium 91526 37437 203965 14560 0.30
    70% coverage at 125% of premium 87406 37437 199845 10440 0.30
Revenue Assurance,75% coverage 86054       37008       197715         21228            0.37
    75% coverage at 75% of premium 89164 37008 200825 24338 0.37
    75% coverage at 125% of premium 82944 37008 194605 18118 0.37
Crop Revenue Coverage,65% coverage 84865        37411      197225           3976            
0.31
    70% coverage 79686 36779 191635 4347 0.38
    75% coverage 72512 35511 183465 6126 0.49
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI)       
    75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu  81428        36247      184935           2234            0.41
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu  78030 36075 189325 -891 0.42
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 85708 37015 197785 4440 0.35
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 84331 36971 196375 3204 0.35
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 88865 56551 201265 3867 0.30
50% Futures hedge and MPCI        
    75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu       87748       46911      217965               -8894            0.28
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu  84348 46668 214405 -10601 0.30
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 92026 47907 222865 -12543 0.20
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 90649 47849 221445 -13243 0.20
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 95183 48499 226345 -17333 0.14
100% Futures hedge and MPCI    
    75% yield coverage at $2.13/ bu 94065       65425      272904                -62684            0.14
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu  90666 65171 269344 -63552 0.15
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 98344 66430 277804 -66981 0.08
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 96968 66370 276394 -67606 0.09
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 101501 67015 281284 -70532 0.05
100% Futures hedge of historical yield 110262 67289 290174 -67471 0.03
50%  Futures hedge of historical yield  103944 48775 235235 -16661 0.1125





Cash Market  20 20
Revenue Assurance,                                                                
65 percent coverage 
                                        1                          1
    65% coverage at 75% of premium 1 1
    65% coverage at 125% of premium 1 1
Revenue Assurance,                                                                
70% coverage
                                        5                           5
    70% coverage at 75% of premium 5 5
    70% coverage at 125% of premium 4 4
Revenue Assurance,                                                                
75% coverage
                                        7                           7
    75% coverage at 75% of premium 13 13
    75% coverage at 125% of premium 4 4
Crop Revenue Coverage,                                                        
65% coverage
                                        0                           0
    70% coverage 0 0
    75% coverage 0 0
Multiple Peril Crop Insurance (MPCI)                                   
75% yield Coverage at $2.13/ bu  
                                        0                            
0
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu  0 0
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 1 1
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 0 0
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 0 0
50% Futures hedge and MPCI                                                
75% yield Coverage at $2.13/ bu
                                      12                            
0
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 1 0
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 11 0
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 1 0
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 6 1
100% Futures hedge and MPCI                                              
75% yield Coverage at $2.13/ bu
                                      13                            
0
    75% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 5 0
    70% yield coverage at $2.28 / bu 11 0
    70% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 5 0
    65% yield coverage at $2.45 / bu 7 1
100% Futures hedge on the historical yield average 20 20
50%  Futures hedge on the historical yield average 20 2026
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